Algorithmic aspects of Social Choice and Auctions

Printer-friendly version
09-08-18 to 10-08-18
St. Petersburg
Event format: 
The International Laboratory of Game Theory and Decision Making invites to participate in the international conference on "Algorithmic Aspects of Social Choice and Auction Design". The meeting will have a single session, with 13 speakers coming from the Computer Science and Microeconomics communities, and a roundtable discussion with Yandex Research about applied problems of economic design faced by Yandex.

Dates: August 09-10, 2018
Place: 3/1-A Kantemirovskaya st., St. Petersburg, Russia

Participation is free but registration is mandatory: please follow the link to register.

Organising Committee:
Hervé Jean Moulin (University of Glasgow, NRU HSE)
Anna Bogomolnaia (University of Glasgow, NRU HSE)
Fedor Sandomirskiy (NRU HSE)
Alexander Nesterov (NRU HSE)
Constantine Sorokin (NRU HSE)


Speaker Title

Shahar Dobzinski, Weizmann Institute of Science

From Cognitive Biases to the Communication Complexity of Local Search
Dobzinski Abstract.pdf
Yannai Gonczarowski, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Microsoft Research The Menu-Size of Approximately Optimal Auctions
Gonczarowski Abstract.pdf
Jason Hartline, Northwestern University TBA
Ron Holzman, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology Pareto-optimality under impartial culture (joint work with Boris Bukh and Christopher Cox)
Elias Koutsoupias, University of Oxford TBA 
Reshef Meir, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology Proxy Voting: from Better Democracy to Better Crowdsourcing
Meir Abstract.pdf

Hervé Jean Moulin, University of Glasgow, National Research University “Higher School of Economics”

Nisarg Shah, University of Toronto Fair and Efficient Collective Decisions
Nisarg Shah Abstract.pdf
Rann Smorodinsky, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology Is it Rational to Keep Up with the Kardashians?
Smorodinsky Abstract.pdf
Constantine Sorokin, National Research University “Higher School of Economics” TBA
Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology Approximate Modularity Revisited (joint work with Uri Feige and Michal Feldman)
Alexey Drutsa and Arsenii Vanunts, Research at Yandex Pricing in Repeated Posted-Price Auctions: Worst-case and Expectation Optimization
Abstract Drutsa and Vanunts.pdf

If you have any questions please contact Xenia Adaeva via

Developed by Paolo Gittoi