Elena Orlova

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Name: 
Elena
Surname: 
Orlova
Current Affiliation: 
University of Bielefeld and University Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne
Fields of interest: 
Game theory & graphs, Network formation, Network games
Supervisor(s): 
A. Rusinowska (Paris 1), F. Riedel (Bielefeld)
PhD dissertation title: 
Preferences and Social Interactions
Abstract: 
The first paper contributes to the literature on evolution of preferences, developing a model with endogenous observability. It examines joint evolution of social preferences (altruism, selfishness, reciprocity etc) and cognitive intelligence that determines the ability to observe opponents’ preferences during interactions. The second paper investigates the conflict between personal preferences and social (network) involvement. It analyses a wide range of games on a fixed network and different functional relationships between social and personal utility components. In the new framework, a Nash equilibrium set is neither a subset nor a superset of the corresponding equilibrium set in the no-preferences framework. Interestingly, there always exists a class of games in which following personal preferences is a unique and strong Nash equilibrium. The third paper extends the previous analysis by introducing a network formation stage. It explores the tension between stability and efficiency in the two-stage network game with heterogeneous preferences.
Developed by Paolo Gittoi