Jérôme Dollinger

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Name: 
Jérôme
Surname: 
Dollinger
Current Affiliation: 
UCLouvain
Fields of interest: 
Coalition theory, Game theory, Network theory
Supervisor(s): 
Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
PhD dissertation title: 
Coalitions interrelations and coevolutions
Abstract: 
Coalitions and networks play a crucial role in the decision making process of economic agents. This dissertation aims at shedding some lights on the formation process of different and related types of coalitions. From individuals to firms, the decision of being connected with another agent might depend upon the structure of several types of coalitions. Individuals have professional and friendship relationships, firms can cooperate through R&D and collusive agreements. The formation of several types of coalitions could be interrelated. To have a better understanding of these interactions, two cases where agents belong to several types of coalitions are studied across this dissertation. In the two first chapters, we investigate the formation of stable R&D and market sharing coalitions by firms in a Cournot setting. Firms are able to create both R&D and market sharing coalitions at the same time. While firms can change the structure of R&D and market sharing coalitions independently from each other in the first chapter, they can only make symmetrical changes in the second chapter. The last chapter is focused on the formation of radial and progressive coalitions (groups) for individuals following two competing social norms. Agents must choose between creating radical or progressive coalitions.
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