Laura Kasper

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Name: 
Laura
Surname: 
Kasper
Current Affiliation: 
Maastricht University, Department of Economics
Fields of interest: 
Matching, social choice, cooperative game theory
Supervisor(s): 
Hans Peters, Dries Vermeulen, Dinko Dimitrov, Dominik Karos
PhD dissertation title: 
Matching, voting and cooperation
Abstract: 
This Thesis covers three topics: matching, voting and cooperation. The first chapter discusses two-sided matching problems in which workers' employment experience shapes firms' preferences. We present a sufficient condition guaranteeing existence of a stable matching and characterize the set of stable matchings. The second chapter provides a characterization of gender consistent resolving rules in matching problems. A resolving rule guides the selection of blocking pairs and, hence, is crucial for the analysis of matching mechanisms. The third chapter focusses on voting theory. We establish the maximal Condorcet consistent voting correspondence that is immune against the two strong no show paradoxes. The last two chapters discuss topics of cooperation. The fourth chapter considers abstract games and introduces extended expectation functions. We then impose three stability and optimality axioms these functions. We show that an extended expectation function satisfies our axioms if and only if it can be associated with a non-cooperative equilibrium of the abstract game. The fifth chapter elaborates on the role of individual transfers in dynamic TU-games. Agents are allowed to transfer worth among periods. We model non-cooperative games based on this idea and identify conditions under which Nash equilibria exist.
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