Recent Developments in Behavioural Economics and Mechanism Design

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24-06-16 to 25-06-16
United Kingdom
Event format: 
Mechanism design is the modern economic analysis of institutions and markets. It has changed the way economists think about optimal institutions when authorities are unaware of individual preferences. In the mechanism design literature, the focus is on designing optimal mechanisms. The prominently successful cases are auction and matching, such as auction houses, labor market for medical interns and school admissions.

The optimal design of markets and institutions has evolved to a curious point: while researchers have explored optimal mechanism design in many complex economic environments, they have largely followed a simplistic approach for modeling agent behavior.

In contrast, psychology and economics—also known as behavioral economics —is a mindset for doing economics that espouses the importance of thinking about the psychological accuracy of models. After a history of identifying deviations from classical approaches, modeling these deviations formally, and empirically establishing their importance in economic decisions, the field is in the process of full integration into economic analysis: researchers are using the new psychologically based models to study how individual behavior plays out in institutions and markets, what the welfare consequences are, and how policy should respond to market outcomes—questions in which economists have always been interested.

The purpose of the workshop is to share information and raise awareness among economists of one important part of the above development, the rapidly growing literature on behavioral mechanism design.

Geoffroy de Clippel of Brown University and Yuval Salant of Northwestern University have agreed to be keynote speakers.

The workshop will aim to

  • Provide a forum for microeconomic theorists with an interest in behavioural economics and mechanism design working in European Universities for interaction with each other and with distinguished keynote speakers.
  • Provide an opportunity for PhD students in Glasgow and other European Universities to interact with distinguished keynote speakers and faculty working in behavioural economics and mechanism design.

Submissions in all areas of behavioural economics and mechanism design are welcome. Preference will be given to completed papers.

Submissions should be e-mailed to the organisers by Monday February 29th 2016; decisions will be communicated shortly after the deadline.

Limited funds for travel and accommodation are available. Travel and accommodation expenses for participants presenting papers will be covered. Participants who do not necessarily want to present a paper are also welcome. Subject to availability, we will aim to refund reasonable travel expenses (equivalent to 2nd class rail fare) to academics and PhD students from SIRE universities who wish to attend, although those offering a paper will be given preference.

For information/queries/reimbursement requests please email the organisers.

If you wish to register as a delegate for this event then you can do so via the Eventbrite booking facility.


The workshop is generously funded by the Adam Smith Business School of the University of Glasgow and by the Scottish Institute for Research in Economics.

Organisers: Sayantan Ghosal and Michele Lombardi, both at the Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow

Call deadline: 
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