# Riccardo Domenico Saulle

Name:

Riccardo Domenico

Surname:

Saulle

E-Mail:

CV:

Current Affiliation:

Maastricht University, Department of Economics

Fields of interest:

Social Environments, Stability, Coalitional Games

Supervisor(s):

Jean-Jacques Herings, Christian Seel, Thomas Demuynck

PhD dissertation title:

The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments

PhD dissertation:

Abstract:

The thesis consists of two parts. In the first part, I introduce a new solution concept for models of coalition formation, called the myopic stable set. The myopic stable set is defined for a very general class of
social environments and allows for an infinite state space. I show that the myopic stable set exists and is non-empty. Under minor continuity conditions, I also demonstrate uniqueness. Furthermore, the myopic stable set is a super-set of the core and of the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-cooperative games. Additionally, the myopic stable set generalizes and unifies various results from more specific environments. In particular, the myopic stable set coincides with the coalition structure core in coalition function form games if the coalition structure core is non-empty; with the set of stable matchings in the standard one-to-one matching model; with the set of pairwise stable networks and closed cycles in models of network formation; and with the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria infinite super-modular games, finite potential games, and aggregative games.
In the second part, I illustrate the versatility of the solution concept by characterizing the myopic stable set in two models: a model of Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs, for which the literature so far has not been able to fully characterize the set of all (mixed) Nash equilibria; a model of coalitional game with heterogeneous agents and a notion of positional concern in the preferences, for which I study the stability of the partition structures in terms of segregation.