Game Theory & Graphs

Graph-theoretic models for multiplayer games - known as graphical games - have nice computational properties and are most appropriate for large population games in which the payoffs for each player are determined by the actions of only a small subpopulation.

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FEEM RE3 Article
Approaching the complexities inherent in human behavior, and compounded by the | READ MORE ...
Article
Michel Grabisch, Peter Sudhölter
A game with precedence constraints is a TU game with restricted cooperation, | READ MORE ...
Blog
This blog offers an interesting view on sports and their statistical and | READ MORE ...
This mini-course was presented by Myrna Wooders at the 2014 International Game | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Sebastian Bervoets, Bruno Decreuse, Mathieu Faure
This paper provides a game-theoretical analysis of the use by athletes of | READ MORE ...
This year's Nobel prize in economic sciences goes to Prof. Jean Tirole of | READ MORE ...
New book
The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in | READ MORE ...
Working paper
P.J.J. Herings, A. Mauleon, V. Vannetelbosch
We provide a tractable concept that can be used to study the influence of the | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Rudolf Müller, Dries Vermeulen
Using a network approach we provide a characterization of a separating | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Ismail M.S.
We illustrate an equivalence between the class of two-person symmetric games | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Jean Hindriks and Yukihiro Nishimura
Multinational companies can shift profit and income between branches in order | READ MORE ...
MobLab is a recently released software for teaching abstract concepts in | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Zsombor Z. Méder, János Flesch, Ronald Peeters
This paper introduces a general framework for dealing with dynamic | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Abhimanyu Khan, Ronald Peeters, Frank Thuijsman, Philippe Uyttendaele
The primary question in coordination games concerns the possibility of | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Hans Peters, Marc Schroeder, Dries Vermeulen
This paper considers the estate division problem from a non-cooperative | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Xinyu Li, Ronald Peeters
We consider a cheap-talk setting that mimics the situation where an incumbent | READ MORE ...
Article
Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer
Consider a setting in which agents can take one of two ordered actions and in | READ MORE ...
Article
Efthymios Athanasiou, Alex John London, Kevin J. S. Zollman
In this paper we distinguish two competing conceptions of dignity, one | READ MORE ...
Book
A wealth of research in recent decades has seen the economic approach to human | READ MORE ...
Article
Christian Seel, Matthias Lang and Philipp Strack
We consider a two-player contest model in which breakthroughs arrive according | READ MORE ...
Article
Christian Seel
This note analyzes a two-player all-pay auction with incomplete information. | READ MORE ...
Article
Christian Seel and Cédric Wasser
We consider a two-player all-pay auction with symmetric independent private | READ MORE ...
Article
M. Grabisch, A. Skoda
The paper aims at generalizing the notion of restricted game on a communication | READ MORE ...
Article
Yann Bramoullé, Rachel Kranton, Martin D'Amours
Geography and social links shape economic interactions. In industries, schools | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Philipp Möhlmeier, Agnieszka Rusinowska and Emily Tanimura
We develop a modification of the connections model by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996 | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Herbert Hamers, Flip Klijn and Marco Slikker
Scheduling jobs of decentralized decision makers that are in competition will | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Sjaak Hurkens
Calculating explicit closed form solutions of Cournot models where firms have | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Iwan Bos , Ronald Peeters and Erik Pot
We consider a model of dynamic price competition to analyze the impact of | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Manuel Förster, Michel Grabisch and Agnieszka Rusinowska
We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have yes-no inclinations | READ MORE ...
Working paper
David Pérez-Castrillo and David Wettstein
We study innovation contests with asymmetric information and identical | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Larbi Alaoui
There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or not | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Murat Öztürk , Hans Peters and Ton Storcken
In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Elias Tsakas
We provide epistemic conditions for correlated rationalizability, which are | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Irem Bozbay
This paper analyses the problem of aggregating judgments when strategic voters | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Tom Truyts
In a model of stochastic costly signaling in the presence of exogenous | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Philippe Bich and Rida Laraki
Several relaxations of Nash equilibrium are shown to exist in strategic games | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Jose Apesteguia, Miguel A. Ballester
Two main school choice mechanisms have attracted the attention in the | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Alexander Vostroknutov
A model of belief dependent preferences in finite multi-stage games with ob- | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Abhimanyu Khan and Ronald Peeters
Inspired by the behavior in repeated guessing game experiments, we study | READ MORE ...
Working paper
We consider agents whose language can only express probabilistic beliefs that | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Burak Can and Ton Storcken
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Flesch J., Kuipers J., Schoenmakers G. and Vrieze K.
We prove the existence of a subgame-perfect "-equilibrium, for every | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Elnaz Bajoori, János Flesch and Dries Vermeulen
Working paper
Helga Habis and P. Jean-Jacques Herings
We study bankruptcy games where the estate and the claims have stochastic | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Quentin Botton, Bernard Fortz, Luis Gouveia and Michael Poss
Given a graph with nonnegative edge weights and node pairs Q, we study the | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Emmanuel Maruani, Michel Grabisch and Agnieszka Rusinowska
The paper concerns a model of influence in which agents make their decisions on | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Hiroshi Uno
This paper introduces the notion of nested best response potentials for | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Erik Pot , János Flesch ;Ronald Peeters , Dries Vermeulen
We study a framework where two duopolists compete repeatedly in prices and | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Gilles Grandjean, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch
Curb sets [Basu and Weibull, Econ. Letters 36 (1991), 141-146] are product sets | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Hiroshi Uno
This note shows that every finite game of strategic complementarities is a | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Bernard De Meyer, Ehud Lehrer and Dinah Rosenberg
In a Bayesian game some players might receive a noisy signal regarding the | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Jean-Sébastien Tancrez, Philippe Chevalier and Pierre Semal
In this paper, we present a bounding methodology that allows to compute a tight | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Paolo Pin, Luca Dall'asta and Abolfazl Ramezanpour
We consider any network environment in which the “best shot game” is played. | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Joseph Abdou and Hans Keiding
We introduce a description of the power structure which is inherent in a strate | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Nicolas Derhy, Christophe Picouleau and Nicolas Trotignon
The three-in-a-tree algorithm of Chudnovsky and Seymour decides in time O(n4) | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Nicolas Trotignon and Kristina Vuskovic
We give a structural description of the class C of graphs that do not contain a | READ MORE ...

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