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Home > An Extreme Point Characterization of Strategy-proof and Unanimous Probabilistic Rules over Binary Restricted Domains

An Extreme Point Characterization of Strategy-proof and Unanimous Probabilistic Rules over Binary Restricted Domains

Working paper
Author/s: 
Hans Peters, Souvik Roy, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Ton Storcken
Issue number: 
RM/16/012
Series: 
GSBE Research Memoranda
Publisher: 
Maastricht University School of Business and Economics
Year: 
2016
Working Paper [1]
We show that every strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rule on a binary restricted domain has binary support, and is a probabilistic mixture of strategy-proof and unanimous deterministic rules. Examples of binary restricted domains include several types of single-dipped domains, the single-peaked domain where peaks are restricted to two adjacent alternatives, and the single-crossing domain with two tops. We also provide some extensions to infinitely many alternatives.
Tags: 
Social Choice [2]

Source URL:http://www.coalitiontheory.net/content/extreme-point-characterization-strategy-proof-and-unanimous-probabilistic-rules-over-binary

Links
[1] http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/file?uuid=8542f63c-501f-4391-85b9-dbde6efa0a41&owner=d44e701a-a140-4e6b-974b-4766533419cd [2] http://www.coalitiontheory.net/research-areas/social-choice