EVENTS
Conference
Economics has traditionally attributed gender differences in labour market outcomes (e.g., occupation, position, pay) to demand-side factors, such as taste-based and statistical discrimination by...
Call deadline: 31 July 2018
Conference
Call for participation in the conference is open to all academics in the areas of theoretical, experimental and applied game theory is encouraged.
Call deadline: 17 August 2018
Training course
One of the main objectives of CA16228 GAMENET is to initiate novel transdisciplinary research links with academia and industrial stakeholders and to prepare competitive EU researchers for a fruitful...
Call deadline: 15 June 2018
Workshop
This workshop is organized jointly with CIRANO and the Sam M. Walton College of Business at the University of Arkansas, and aims to gather researches to share and discuss advances in theoretical and...
Call deadline: 31 May 2018
Workshop
The 3rd workshop and 2nd summer school of Psychological Game Theory will be held in the historical center of Soleto, a small southern-Italian village of the Salento peninsula (Apulia region, South of...
NEWS
ctn
Next CTN Workshop will be held in Marseilles, France on 16-17 May 2019.
Confirmed key note speakers: Matthew Jackson, Adam Szeidl and Asuman Ozdaglar
12 June 2018
VACANCIES
PUBLICATIONS
Working paper
ctn
The multiple partners game (Sotomayor, 1992) extends the assignment game to a matching model where the agents can have several partners, up to their quota, and the utilities are additively separable...
08 June 2018
Working paper
ctn
We present a general existence result for a type of equilibrium in normal-form games. We consider nonzero-sum normal-form games with an arbitrary number of players and arbitrary action spaces. We...
08 June 2018
Working paper
ctn
This paper takes an axiomatic bargaining approach to bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility by characterizing bankruptcy rules in terms of properties from bargaining theory. In particular,...
08 June 2018
Working paper
ctn
Finitely many agents have single-peaked preferences on a finite set of alternatives structured as a tree. Under a richness condition on the domain we characterize all unanimous and strategy-proof...
08 June 2018
Working paper
ctn
A social choice correspondence is self-implementable in strong equilibrium if it is implementable in strong equilibrium by a social choice function selecting from the correspondence itself as a game...
08 June 2018
Working paper
ctn
We assess systematic risk in the U.S. banking system before and after the Panic of 1873 using a combination of linear programming and computational optimization to estimate the interbank network...
08 June 2018
Working paper
ctn
Approval voting allows voters to list any number of candidates. Their scores are obtained by
summing the votes cast in their favor. Fractional voting instead follows the One-person-onevote...
08 June 2018
Working paper
ctn
A principal targets agents organized in a network of local complementarities, in order to increase the sum of agents’ effort. We consider bilateral public contracts `a la Segal (1999). The paper...
08 June 2018