Matching

How to match individuals to other individuals or goods is an important problem in society: e.g. student placement in schools; labor markets where workers and firms are matched; organ donation where patients are matched to potential donors. Matching theory and market design analyze these problems and propose solutions to improve real-life institutions. In recent years, advances in matching theory and market design have helped New York City and Boston to design their school choice programs, medical communities to reorganize their hiring procedure, and to organize systematic kidney exchange mechanisms to give kidneys to as many patients as possible.

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