Some Things Couples Always Wanted to Know about Stable Matchings (but were afraid to ask) (Revised)

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Working paper
Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn and Jordi Massó
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We deter- mine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of stable matchings. We illustrate how small deviations from (weak) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion that excludes myopic blocking. Our remaining results deal with various properties of the set of stable matchings for “responsive couples markets,” viz., optimality, filled positions, and manipulation.
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