Game Theory & Graphs

Graph-theoretic models for multiplayer games - known as graphical games - have nice computational properties and are most appropriate for large population games in which the payoffs for each player are determined by the actions of only a small subpopulation.

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Divide and Choose among two agents, and the Diminishing Share (DS) and Moving | READ MORE ...
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Anna Bogomolnaia, Hervé Moulin, Richard Stong
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Matt V. Leduc, Matthew O. Jackson, Ramesh Johari
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All equilibrium concepts implicitly make a correct beliefs assumption, stating | READ MORE ...
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Working paper
Anne Van den Nouweland and Myrna Wooders
Share equilibrium was introduced in van den Nouweland and Wooders (2011) as an | READ MORE ...
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Parkash Chander and Myrna Wooders
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Working paper
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János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski
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Working paper
Nobuyuki Hanaki, Emily Tanimura, Nicolaas J. Vriend
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Philipp Möhlmeier, Agnieszka Rusinowska, Emily Tanimura
In a network formation framework, where payoffs reflect an agent’s ability to | READ MORE ...
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Kutay Cingiz, János Flesch, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski
We study centipede games played by an infinite sequence of players. Following | READ MORE ...
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Juliette Rouchier, Emily Tanimura
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Philipp Möhlmeier, Agnieszka Rusinowska, Emily Tanimura
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Working paper
Alessandra Casella, Jean-François Laslier, Antonin Macé
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Working paper
Aidas Masiliunas
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Working paper
Nagore Iriberri and Pedro Rey-Biel
In a two-stage elimination math contest participants aged from 10 to 16 compete | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Nagore Iriberri and Pedro Rey-Biel
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P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Andrey Meshalkin, Arkadi Predtetchinski
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Alessandro Tavoni (LSE & FEEM) has published a commentary on how to use | READ MORE ...
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Ingrid Rohde
Coordination is a vital element of human life, whether it be greeting each | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Tom Dedeurwaerdere, Paolo Melindi-Ghidi, Willem Sas
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Working paper
Flip Klijn, Marc Vorsatz
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Working paper
Kutay Cingiz, Jànos Flesch, P. Jean-Jacques Herings
We study centipede games played by an infinite sequence of players. Following | READ MORE ...
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Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum
In this paper we consider two means for implementing the informational benefits | READ MORE ...
Working paper
P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Harold Houba
We study strategic negotiation models featuring costless delay, general | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Diego Cerdeiro, Marcin Dziubinski, Sanjeev Goyal
Individuals derive benefits from their connections, but these may, at the same | READ MORE ...
Book
Paul Belleflamme, Martin Peitz
Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies offers an up-to-date and | READ MORE ...
Working paper
Lorenzo Cerda Planas
The aim of this paper is twofold. Starting from the population dynamics | READ MORE ...

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