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Home > Entry in First-price Auctions with Signaling

Entry in First-price Auctions with Signaling

Working paper
Author/s: 
Olivier Bos, Tom Truyts
Issue number: 
2016/17
Series: 
CORE Discussion Papers
Publisher: 
CORE, Louvain University
Year: 
2016
Working Paper [1]
We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the participation decisions and the auction outcome are used by an outside observer to infer the bidders’ types. We show that this auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding function. The expected revenue maximizing entry fee is the maximal fee that guarantees full participation.
Tags: 
Trade Theory [2]

Source URL:http://www.coalitiontheory.net/content/entry-first-price-auctions-signaling

Links
[1] http://alfresco.uclouvain.be/alfresco/service/guest/streamDownload/workspace/SpacesStore/7d188c5f-4ce3-4636-8c84-558b4ee6a2bb/coredp2016_17web.pdf?guest=true [2] http://www.coalitiontheory.net/research-areas/trade-theory