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Approximate Cores Of Games and Economies With Clubs

Working paper
Author/s: 
Alexander Kovalenkov
Issue number: 
634
Publisher: 
University of Warwick
Year: 
2002
PDF [1]
We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games with and without sidepayments and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems. The parameters bound (a) the number of approximate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size of nearly effective groups of players and their distance from exact effectiveness. Our theorems are based on a new notion of partition-balanced profiles and approximately partition-balanced profiles. The results are applied to a new model of an economy with clubs. In contrast to the extant literature, our approach allows both widespread externalities and uniform results.
Tags: 
Political Economy [2]

Source URL:http://www.coalitiontheory.net/content/approximate-cores-games-and-economies-clubs

Links
[1] http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp634.pdf [2] http://www.coalitiontheory.net/research-areas/political-economy