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Single-peaked choice

Working paper
Author/s: 
Walter Bossert and Hans Peters
Issue number: 
RM/06/037
Publisher: 
Maastricht University
Year: 
2006
PDF [1]
Single-peaked preferences have played an important role in the literature ever since they were used by Black (1948) to formulate a domain restriction that is sufficient for the exclusion of cycles according to the majority rule. In this paper, we approach single-peakedness from a choice-theoretic perspective. We show that the well-known axiom independence of irrelevant alternatives (a form of contraction consistency) and a weak continuity requirement characterize a class of single-peaked choice functions. Moreover, we examine the rationalizability and the rationalizability-representability of these choice functions.
Tags: 
Social Choice [2]

Source URL:http://www.coalitiontheory.net/content/single-peaked-choice

Links
[1] http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=5338 [2] http://www.coalitiontheory.net/research-areas/social-choice