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Common belief in approximate rationality

Article
Author/s: 
Angie Mounir, AndrésPerea, EliasTsakas
Mathematical Social Sciences
Issue number: 
Volume 91, January 2018
Publisher: 
Elsevier
Year: 
2017
Journal pages: 
6-16
Journal Article [1]
This paper substitutes the standard rationality assumption with approximate rationality in normal form games. We assume that players believe that their opponents might be ε-rational, i.e. willing to settle for a suboptimal choice, and so give up an amount ε of expected utility, in response to the belief they hold. For every player i and every opponents’ degree of rationality ε, we require player i to attach at least probability Fi(ε) to his opponent being ε-rational, where the functions Fi are assumed to be common knowledge amongst the players. We refer to this event as belief in F-rationality. The notion of Common Belief in F-Rationality (CB FR) is then introduced as an approximate rationality counterpart of the established Common Belief in Rationality. Finally, a corresponding recursive procedure is designed that characterizes those beliefs players can hold under CB FR.
Tags: 
Game Theory & Graphs [2]

Source URL:http://www.coalitiontheory.net/content/common-belief-approximate-rationality

Links
[1] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489617301312#! [2] http://www.coalitiontheory.net/research-areas/game-theory-graphs