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Agreeing to Disagree with Conditional Probability Systems

Article
Author/s: 
Elias Tsakas
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Issue number: 
Volume 18, Issue 2
Publisher: 
De Gruyter
Year: 
2018
Journal article [1]
In this note, we extend Aumann’s agreement theorem to a framework where beliefs are modelled by conditional probability systems à la Battigalli, P., and M. Siniscalchi. 1999. “Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games.” Journal of Economic Theory 88: 188–230. We prove two independent generalizations of the agreement theorem, one where the agents share some common conditioning event, and one where they may not.
Tags: 
Game Theory & Graphs [2]

Source URL:http://www.coalitiontheory.net/content/agreeing-disagree-conditional-probability-systems

Links
[1] https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2018.18.issue-2/bejte-2016-0182/bejte-2016-0182.xml?format=INT [2] http://www.coalitiontheory.net/research-areas/game-theory-graphs