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Home > Network formation with myopic and farsighted players

Network formation with myopic and farsighted players

Working paper
Author/s: 
Chenghong Luo, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
Issue number: 
2018/25
Series: 
CORE Discussion Papers
Publisher: 
Université catholique de Louvain
Year: 
2018
Working Paper [1]
We study the formation of networks where myopic and farsighted individuals decide with whom they want to form a link, according to a distance-based utility function that weighs the costs and beneÖts of each connection. We propose the notion of myopic-farsighted stable set to determine the networks that emerge when some individuals are myopic while others are farsighted. A myopic-farsighted stable set is the set of networks satisfying internal and external stability with respect to the notion of myopic-farsighted improving path. In the case of a homogeneous population (either all myopic or all farsighted), a conáict between stability and e¢ ciency is likely to arise. But, once the population becomes mixed, the conáict vanishes if there are enough farsighted individuals. In addition, we characterize the myopic-farsighted stable set for any utility function when all individuals are myopic.
Tags: 
Game Theory & Graphs [2]
Industrial Organisation [3]

Source URL:http://www.coalitiontheory.net/content/network-formation-myopic-and-farsighted-players

Links
[1] https://alfresco.uclouvain.be/alfresco/service/guest/streamDownload/workspace/SpacesStore/3c6d3fb2-ff40-4187-92c0-23b964507492/coredp2018_25web.pdf?guest=true [2] http://www.coalitiontheory.net/research-areas/game-theory-graphs [3] http://www.coalitiontheory.net/research-areas/industrial-organisation