www.coalitiontheory.net
Published on www.coalitiontheory.net (http://www.coalitiontheory.net)

Home > Perfect information games where each player acts only once

Perfect information games where each player acts only once

Article
Author/s: 
Kutay Cingiz, János Flesch, P. Jean-Jacques, Arkadi Predtetchinski
Economic Theory
Publisher: 
Springer
Year: 
2019
Journal Article [1]
We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games have no subgame perfect ϵ -equilibrium for any ϵ sufficiently small. Furthermore, we present a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect ϵ -equilibrium.
Tags: 
Game Theory & Graphs [2]

Source URL:http://www.coalitiontheory.net/content/perfect-information-games-where-each-player-acts-only-once

Links
[1] https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00199-019-01199-3 [2] http://www.coalitiontheory.net/research-areas/game-theory-graphs