Articles

Articles authored by researchers who are part of the Coalition Theory Network and published in international reviews are displayed in this section.

2006

The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies

A. Perea, P. J. J. Herings and A. Predtetchinski,

Formation of a Communication Network Under Perfect Foresight

Frédéric Deroïan

Tags: Network Formation

2005

Strategic union delegation and strike activity Vincent Vannetelbosch and Ana Mauleon	Core concepts for dynamic TU-games Andrés Perea, L. Kranich and H. Peters
Selective penalization of polluters: an inf-convolution approach Antoine Soubeyran and Ngo Van Long

2004

Market Sharing Agreements and Collusive Networks Paul Belleflamme andFrancis Bloch	Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments Martin Strobel and Dirk Engelmann Tags: Experiments
The strong sequential core in a dynamic exchange economy Hans Peters, Arkadi Predtetchinski and P. Jean-Jacques Herings	A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game Arkadi Predtetchinski and P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation Games with Positive Spillovers Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch Tags: Coalition Formation Theory	Rationalizability for social environments Ana Mauleon, P.Jean-Jacques Herings and Vincent Vannetelbosch Tags: Environment

2003

Imperfect competition à la Negishi, also with fixed costs Pierre Dehez, Jacques H. Drèze and Takashi Suzuki	Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control Henry Tulkens, Marc Germain, Philippe Toint and Aart de Zeeuw
A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games: An Experimental Study Martin Strobel, T. Decker and A. Stiehler	Factor Accumulation and Trade: Dynamic Comparative Advantage with Endogenous Physical and Human Capital Eric W. Bond and Ping Wang Tags: Trade Theory
Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem Henry Tulkens and Johan Eyckmans Tags: Environment

2002

Gradualism in Trade Agreements with Asymmetric Countries

Eric W. Bond and Jee-Hyeong Park

The strong sequential core for two-period economies

Hans Peters, Arkadi Predtetchinski and P.Jean-Jacques Herings

2000

Bargaining and Sharing Innovative Knowledge

Claude d'Aspremont, Sudipto Bhattacharya and Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet

Tags: Bargaining Theory

1998

Linear Inequality Methods to Enforce Partnerships under Uncertainty: An Overview

Claude d'Aspremont and Louis-André Gérard-Varet

Pages

Developed by Paolo Gittoi